Peoples' Rights: The Case of Bayei Separatism by Murray, Andrew
(11 y
Peoples’ Rights: The Case 
of Bayei Separatism
Human & Peoples’ Rights 
Project Monograph No.9
titute of Southern African Studies 
c \ National University of Lesotho 
P O Roma 180 Lesotho
Peoples’ Rights: The Case 
of Bayei Separatism
By
Andrew Murray
Human & Peoples’ Rights 
Project Monograph No.9
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho
The ISAS Human and Peoples’ Rights Project is supported by 
the Ford Foundation. It is a regional research project drawing 
on academic resources in the Southern African region. The 
series has been edited by NUL/ISAS staff members.
First Published in Lesotho, through the National University o f  
Lesotho’s Institute o f  Southern African Studies, 1990.
This publication is set in 10 point Times. Pre-press proof were  
prepared using DTP technology.
©Copyright Reserved 
by ISAS/NUL 1990
The views expressed herein are attributable to the Author. 
Neither ISAS nor NUL hold responsibility for them.
T y p e s e t t i n g  by Epic Printers
Maseru, Lesotho
Contents
I. Introduction 1
II. ‘Rights in Tswanadom’ 3
III. The Decline of the Batawana
State 1906-1937 4
IV. Reform and the Emergence
of Separatist Politics 1937-1954 9
V. Reform and the Emergence 
of Nationalist Politics
Ngamiland 1954-1 966 25
VI. Conclusion: The Triumph of 
Tswanadom, 1966-1988 34
Glossary 36
Notes 37
I. Introduction
Peoples’ Rights: 1
The Case of Bayei Separatism
During March and April 1961 a campaign o f  civil disobedience was 
carried on by the BaYei inhabitants o f  Maun, capital o f  the Batawana  
Reserve o f  Ngamiland in the northwestern region o f  the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate.
The BaYei refused to recognise the authority o f  the BaTawana Regent,  
withdrew regimental labour, and boycotted kgotla  meetings. These acts 
o f  defiance were the climax o f  a struggle for communal rights which  
had been initiated in the late 1940s as demands for social and econom ic  
equality but had evolved by 1961 into a call for complete independence  
from the BaTawana in a new BaYei state.
Why this aspiration eventually came to nothing, why the struggle for 
communal rights ultimately ended in failure, had much to do with an­
other development during the early months o f  1961, the launch o f  the 
Bechuanaland P eop le ’s Party, which shortly thereafter became the ter­
ritory’s first popular nationalist party.
One o f  its founders, its Secretary-General Motsamai Mpho, was a 
MoYei  and had been a leading spokesman o f  BaYei separatism. As a na­
tionalist politician, however, he now turned his back on communal  
politics, the politics o f  “ tribalism”, and looked to a new goal, “Bechua­
naland needs one united nation irrespective o f  their race or creed.” 1 He 
urged the BaYei to put their trust in nationalist politics; only with the 
com ing o f  Independence and the creation o f  the nation-state o f  B otsw a­
na would BaTawana dominance finally be broken. Yet, after 1966, not 
only did the BaTawana remain politically dominant in Ngamiland, but 
nationalist politics brought with it a western, individualistic concept  
of rights which did not recognise the legitimacy of BaYei aspirations.
This essay traces the story o f  the BaYei and their struggle for com m u­
nal rights. Central to this story is the changing relationship o f  two 
states: the local state o f  the BaTawana and the central state o f  the c o ­
lonial administration.
It is the impact of British attempts to reform and democratise the Ba- 
Tawana state w hich  determ ined the t im ing and character o f  the 
struggle, its evolution into separatist politics, and eventually, its appar­
ent conquest by the politics o f  nationality. Thus this essay is as much 
about the decline (but not the fall) o f  the BaTawana state as it is about
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BaYei separatism; the latter was a symptom of the former.
The essay is also about rights. Before the narrative is launched it 
should perhaps be prefaced by a brief discussion o f  the nature o f  the 
rights demanded by the BaYei, since the subject o f  human rights in 
“traditional” societies is matter o f  some controversy.2
II. Rights in ‘Tswanadom’
Jack Donnelly has argued that “the idea o f  human rights, as that term 
is normally understood -  namely as rights/titles/claims held by all in­
dividuals simply because they arc human beings -  is foreign to tradi­
tional African soc ie ty  and political cu lture .”3 Human rights, he 
suggest, can only be held by an individual; since their source is human 
nature, they are also universal. Rights in ‘traditional’ societies,  states 
Donnelly, are usually held by communities, not individuals; their 
source is membership o f  a particular community, and they should be 
termed peop les’ rather human rights.4
In pre-colonial ‘Tswanadom, ’ a term invented by Neil Parsons and ap­
plied to those states where Tswana political culture was dominant, the 
concept o f  rights corresponds fairly c lose ly  to the concept of peop les’ 
rights as defined by Donnelly. The right to property, the right to receive  
justice, the right to freedom of movement, were privileges accorded to 
members o f  a kgotla ,  or ward, the basic administrative and judicial unit 
of Tswanadom. Those who were denied membership o f  a ward were  
batlhanka,  serfs with few legal rights at all. The status o f  batlhanka  
was usually reserved for subject peoples conquered by the Tswana 
dikgosi.
When the BaYei began their agitation for communal rights in 1948  
their first demand was for their own kgotlas.  They, as BaYei, wanted  
to be regarded as full members o f  the morafe\  in order to achieve this 
they sought the abolition of the institution o f  botlhanka.  Their concept  
of rights accorded with that o f  their BaTawana overlords. Even when  
the demands of the BaYei stretched to encompass separatism, their d e­
finition o f  political independence was determined by that o f  Tswana­
dom: they wanted to set up a Tswana-style state and invented a tradition 
of chieftainship to facilitate the introduction of bogosi.
It should be clearly understood then, that the ‘rights’ demanded by the 
BaYei were not akin to the Western conception o f  human rights, but 
were rights which were held primarily by a community: p eop les ’ 
rights.5
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III. The Decline of the BaTawana 
State 1906-1937
In 1906 Sekgoma Lctsholathebe (1 8 9 1 -1 9 0 6 ) ,  the most able and char­
ismatic o f  the BaTawana Kings, was deposed by the British. This event  
effective ly  marks the beginning o f  colonial rule in Ngamiland and the 
subsequent decline o f  the BaTawana state. The state had been in ex ist­
ence for little more than fifty years.6
The BaTawana, an offshoot o f  the BaNgwato, had migrated to Ngami­
land during the late eighteenth century. Theirs was only the latest o f  a 
series o f  migrations into the region, the most important o f  which had 
been that o f  the BaYei and the HaMbukushu from the middle Zambezi 
perhaps as early as 1000 A .D.
Primarily agriculturists and fishermen, these peoples found the Oka­
vango Delta a paradise of fertile soils  and plentiful rivers. The pasto- 
ralist BaTawana, however, brought not only cattle but a tradition o f  a 
strong, centralized state. Under King Letsholathebe I (1 8 4 6 -7 4 ) ,  the 
‘stateless so c ie t ie s ’ o f  the BaYei and the HaMbukushu were incorpor­
ated into the BaTawana state. The process o f  subjugation appears to 
have been a peaceful one, being achieved through the imposition o f  a 
system o f  provincial government and the growth o f  a system of  client-  
ship. Only with the BaYei, who outnumbered the BaTawana by two to 
one, was a coercive tactic used in the shape o f  the institution o f  botl-  
hanka, a kind o f  hereditary serfdom.
The coming of the Europeans at first served only to strengthen the Ba­
Tawana state: the trade in ivory filled the royal coffers and enabled the 
state to arm and mount its fighting men. In 1883 the BaTawana inflicted  
a crushing defeat on an Am aNdebele invasion, and in 1885 a su ccess ­
ful military expedition was mounted to what is now southeastern An­
gola. During the 1890s, during what Tlou terms the scramble for 
Ngamiland, Sekgoma Letsholathebe outwitted both British govern­
ment officials and concessions to protect Ngamiland from incorpora­
tion and exp lo ita tion .  The BaTawana eco n om y  f lourished  under 
Sekgoma as never before, despite the terrible rinderpest epidemic of  
1 8 96-7 .  His cattle and corn laws protected the producer from both 
natural disasters and the greed o f  traders.
Sekgom a’s energy and competence created powerful enemies. In 1906  
an anti-Sekgoma coalition o f  discontented dikgosana  (royals), traders, 
missionaries, and Khama III o f  the BaNgwato, engineered his dow n­
fall. The coalition wanted to replace Sekgoma with his nephew Math- 
iba, a young man whom they considered could be moulded to their 
design. Unfortunately Sekgoma was a popular King and could count 
on considerable, perhaps majority, support from within the morafe.  An 
appeal to the British to decide who was the rightful kgosi solved the 
coalit ion’s dilemma. The British mounted a small military expedition  
to Ngamiland, sufficient enough to intimidate S ekgom a’s supporters.  
The British held an inquiry which found in favour o f  Mathiba.
The deposition o f  Sekgoma was a watershed in Ngam iland’s political 
history. British interference in and control over BaTawana affairs 
would assume growing importance in the decades which followed, con ­
tributing significantly to the weakening o f  the authority and legitim ­
acy of the BaTawana state. As important, perhaps, were the divisions  
within the morafe  created by the supposition. In the immediate after- 
math o f  the coup, Sekgom a’s supporters broke away and set up what 
they hoped would become a new morafe  on the banks o f  the Chobe 
river. The deaths o f  Sekgoma in 1914 and his son David in 1916 de­
stroyed that dream. When the Sekgoma-ites returned, the enmity sur­
vived and helps explain the failure of Mathiba and his successors to 
obtain obedience and respect from more than a minority o f  the m orafe .7
Mathiba (1 9 0 6 -1 9 3 2 )  him self proved to be an ineffectual kgosi.  The 
Resident Commissioner, Francis William Panzera, wrote in 1908 that 
“Mathiba is painfully weak in character. He is much more imbued with  
the characteristics o f  a lady missionary than those of a ruler.”8 At first 
the dikgosana  who had toppled Sekgoma governed through a family  
council o f  uncles; however, the uncles soon quarreled among them­
selves  leaving poor Mathiba to try to rule by himself. When he ordered 
the removal o f  the capital from Tsau to Maun in 1915, he faced fierce 
opposition from several leading members o f  the m orafe , in particular 
those who grazed their cattle in the Tsau area. Seven years later, in 
1922, Mathiba had taken to burning the huts o f  those who refused to 
move to Maun.9 By this time, however, Mathiba had also taken to drink 
and it was virtually his last effort to assert his authority.
The move to Maun proved to be a serious mistake. Moving the capi­
tal was not unusual, the BaTawana had become accustomed to shifting  
their ground when the range had become overgrazed or fo l low ing  natu­
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ral disaster: the Kgwebe Hills, Toteng, Matsiancng, Digogwaneng, Na- 
manyane, Kanakaku and Nakalotswee had all been used as sites for 
capitals in the past. Maun and its environs, however, became increas­
ingly threatened by tsetse fly and during the 1920s livestock were 
dying from nagana (sleeping sickness). As the decade wore on even  
those BaTawana who had made the move to Maun were deserting the 
capital.10
In 1928 the British considered appointing a council o f  two headmen  
to ‘a ssist’ Mathiba. Mathiba managed to resist their efforts for three 
years; the BaTawana were themselves suspicious of a ‘c o u n c i l ’ which  
they regarded as a threat to the integrity o f  the institution o f  bogosi .  
However, in 1931 the behaviour o f  Mathiba finally forced the issue: 
Resident Magistrate Vivien Ellenberger reported that “Chief M athiba’s 
total lack o f  authority over his people and his failure to attend to mat­
ters concerning the tribe has rendered the further transaction o f  busi­
ness between m yself  and him and the tribe im possib le .” 11
In April 1931, Mogalakwe Thabeng and headman Wetshootsile Ditha- 
po were appointed by the morafe  to assist Mathiba. Each represented 
a faction within the morafe: Mogalakwe was one o f  the family council 
o f  uncles who had originally advised Mathiba and Wetshootsile had led 
those BaTawana opposed to the move from Tsau to Maun. They were 
also very wealthy. M ogalakwe was the richest headman in Ngamiland,  
with 20 ,000 cattle; Wetshootsile owned a more modest 7 ,000. 2 Neither 
were particularly pleased about their appointment as councillors and 
had agreed to serve for only 12 months. Ellenberger attempted to con­
vince the morafe  that a new start had to be made: “the time has come  
to organise a proper system wherein every man will fulfill his object  
in life and his obligations to the State, to the Chief and to the Tribe.” 13 
He urged Mathiba and his councillors to appoint a Tribal Secretary, to 
build a Tribal Office, and establish a Tribal Fund. Regiments should  
scour the swamps and locate those who were hiding from the tax co l­
lectors and re-establish communication between Maun and the rest of  
Ngamiland.
A few months later Ellenberger reported that “the Council has been a 
complete failure...there is not a man in Ngamiland possessed o f  the 
combination o f  influence, initiative and strength o f  mind to make a 
leader.”14 Mogalakwe told Ellenberger that the problem was Maun it­
self: “We have no principal v illage today, and there is no-one to attend 
meetings. We call the people to attend on Tribal matters and no-one
com es .”15 Another headman explained that “It is not our custom to tell 
the Chief how to rule.” The BaTawana asked that Moremi III, Mathi- 
ba’s son, should be brought back from school and installed as kgosi.  
The British responded that Moremi was still too young and had to com ­
plete his schooling  before he could return to Ngamiland. They offered  
the BaTawana a stark choice: accept an acting Chief or direct rule by 
the Government would be imposed.
After much discussion, Monnamaburu, brother o f  Sekgoma Letshola­
thebe, was installed as Regent in July 1932. Monnamaburu was only  
fourth in the royal line; Moshuga and Disang were senior to him but 
the British refused to accept either as regent since, according to Ellen- 
berger, “both are useless individuals from every point of  v ie w ” .16 M on­
namaburu had the necessary experience. As Mogalakwe pointed out, 
he took charge of Sekgom a’s people when Sekgoma was held in deten­
tion by the British; more importantly, when Sekgoma arrived he handed 
the people over to him .17 However, Monnamaburu was ignored for the 
most part by the BaTawana. Resident Magistrate Cuzen reported that 
“he may mean well but he just cannot get things done...the Police are 
collecting most o f  the tax.” 18
In 1934 Monnamaburu was replaced by Dibolaeng, son o f  Wetshoot-  
sile. Once again the BaTawana had wanted Moshupa to be Regent, or 
failing Moshupa another brother o f  Mathiba, Gaetsalwe. Gaetsalwe, 
however, had been convicted o f  stock theft and non- payment o f  tax 
and was thus vetoed by the British. What the BaTawana really wanted 
was the return o f  Moremi III but the British were immovable. Resident 
Commissioner Charles Rey looked forward “with real alarm to the day 
when Moremi III will  assume the chieftainship...he is a hopeless char­
acter and I do not think he will  ever be suitable to be a ch ie f .” 19 There 
appeared to be no alternative; by the end of 1934 Dibolaen, who had 
made a very good first impression with the British, faced growing op­
position to his authority. The most vocal complaints against Dibolaeng  
were made by a coterie o f  powerful and wealthy kgam elo -holders resi­
dent in Maun.20 A British official remarked, “If Moremi III returns, as 
he is comparatively poor himself, he will largely have to depend on 
these men who would be an undesirable influence.”21
In 1935 the British initiated a process o f  reform in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate with the Native Administration and Tribal Proclamations. 
The brainchild o f  Resident Commissioner Charles Rey, these reforms 
were supposed to democratise administration in the reserves at the e x ­
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pense o f  the authority o f  the dikgosi.  For that reason they were fierce­
ly opposed by dikgosi,  and in Ngamiland the BaTawana refused to con­
sider implementation o f  the reforms until Moremi III was installed as 
chief. British officials  in Ngamiland saw in these reforms a basis for 
revitalisation o f  BaTawana administration. They regarded Dibolaeng  
as responsible for their implementation. Caught in the middle, D ibo­
laeng could please no-one and he resigned in February 1936. The Brit­
ish were being blackmailed; yet the Proclamations were so important 
that they submitted without a struggle. It was agreed that Moremi III 
should be installed as ch ief  in early 1937. They even accepted Gaet- 
salwe as caretaker regent until Moremi III returned. For them, the Pro­
clamations represented a means of halting what appeared to be an 
almost irreversible process: the decline and breakup o f  the BaTawana 
state.
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IV. Reform and the Emergence 
of Separatist Politics 1937-54
Moremi III was installed as kgosi  on 10 February 1937. The British 
did not have high hopes o f  his abilities, but at least, so they thought, 
the Proclamations could at last be properly implemented. The new 
ch ief approached the task o f  administrative reform with energy and en­
thusiasm. He had chosen to model him self upon Tshekedi Khama, and 
had at first, like his idol, been opposed to the Proclamations. But when  
he arrived in Maun, Moremi III found that there was very little tribal 
organisation left with which he could assert his authority. The tribal 
capital, Maun, had a population o f  only 600 -  Serowe, Tshekedi’s capi­
tal, had over 20 ,000  inhabitants.22
In Sekgom a’s time, each MoTawana  belonged to a Maun ward and was  
responsible to the headman o f  that ward; part o f  each year was spent 
in Maun itself, and the rest at the cattle post. In the late 1930s most of  
the BaTawana lived outside Maun all the year round and came rarely, 
if ever, to theTsetse fly infested capital. If the BaTawana did not come  
to Maun, as M ogalakwe and others never tired o f  telling the Govern­
ment, there could be no effective  tribal administration. In Sekgom a’s 
time even the men appointed to administer the districts lived in Maun 
most of the year. By 1937 the ten districts o f  Sekgom a’s era had been  
amalgamated into four hopelessly large and unwieldy districts; their 
administrators had become inactive (they no longer collected tax for 
example) and maintained only sporadic contact with Maun.23
Moremi III decided to use the Proclamations to help him introduce a 
new system o f  administration based upon that o f  the BaNgwato Kgosi  
Khama III. The essential element o f  Khama’s (post 1897) system, ac­
cording to his son Tshekedi Khama, “was that all his people should 
have permanent vil lage settlements in specific  districts.”24 Moremi III 
planned not only to bring the BaTawana back to Maun but to concen­
trate the rest o f  the population o f  Ngamiland into big vil lages. By this 
means he hoped to establish effective control over all o f  his subjects,  
a control that was so noticeably lacking in 1937. Tshekedi Khama 
helped to provide Moremi III with more altruistic reasons for this rev­
o lu tion-  “so that they can take a full part in tribal affairs and have their 
children educated e tc .”25-  but Moremi I l l ’s actions soon made clear
that he was more an autocrat than a democrat.
The Prociamations of 1935 made provision for the setting up o f  Sen­
ior and Junior Tribunals which would be responsible for administration 
and justice in the capital and the districts. Moremi III cooperated with 
the British in the creation o f  seven Junior Tribunals (Sehitwa, Tsau, 
Nokaneng, Gomare, Ikwaga, Mohembo, and Kabamokoni) and one 
C h ie f ’s Tribunal in Maun which had jurisdiction over all Ngamiland. 
He appointed a C h ie f ’s Representative to act as President o f  each Jun­
ior Tribunal. In theory the C h ie f ’s Representative (a M oTawana)  would  
be assisted by the tribunal which in turn was supposed to be made up 
o f  “the Headmen o f  the local subservient tribes.” 6
This was a radical move; in effect it meant that subject peoples such 
as the BaYei and HaMbukushu were for the first time to have a voice  
in local government. Moremi III was not prepared to accept this inno­
vation; two years before he had informed a Government official that 
“ he and the tribe do not want any members o f  the subordinate tribes...to  
be given authority over their fe llow s in administrative, as opposed to 
judicial matters.” The British did not press the point; they assumed that 
he was deferring to reactionary elements within the morafe  and that 
once Moremi was financially independent he would be able to act in a 
more liberal fashion.
The next stage in the process o f  reform was the encouragement o f  the 
growth of Tswana-type v il lages  around the Junior Tribunals. Schools,  
medical dispensaries and trading stores were sited in these new admin­
istrative centres with the hope o f  attracting the scattered population to 
move their residences and thus facilitate more effecient administration, 
in particular the collection o f  taxes. Government had been com plain­
ing about poor tax revenues from Ngamiland throughout the 1930s; to 
a large extent the whole purpose o f  administrative reform was to bring 
about an improvement in those revenues. New  tax registers were dawn 
up in 1940 and tax collection placed once again in the hands o f  C h ie f ’s 
Representatives. There was a significant improvement: tax collected  
increased from under £3 ,00 0  in 1 9 37 -3 8  to nearly £ 7 ,0 0 0  in 1 9 4 0 -  
4 1.28
Administrative reform was only partly responsible for the increasing  
tax revenues. There was also a new source o f  cash: incomes from mi­
grant labour. The Witwatersrand Native Labour A ssociation (WENE- 
LA) had been given permission to establish a depot in Maun in 1937. 
Their primary interest was not recruitment in Ngamiland itse lf  but in
10 ISAS Human and Peoples’ Rights Series No. 9
Angola; Ngamiland was to provide a route for the transport o f  migrant 
labour. Government was only too pleased to approve a W ENELA  
scheme to build a dirt road to Mohembo, particularly s ince it also  
linked most o f  the new administrative centres. By 1950 over 4 ,000  la­
bourers were sent to the mines via the Maun depot each year, 3 ,540  o f  
these from Angola but nearly 800 were Ngamiland taxpayers.29 Most 
of these labourers received their deferred pay in Ngamiland: in 1950 a 
total o f  R 81,743 was paid out, and according to the District C om m is­
sioner “a large proportion o f  it was spent in the district.”30
This influx o f  cash into Ngamiland after 1940 was to have wider reper­
cussions than the increase o f  tax revenues. Much o f  the money was  
spent in the new administrative centres which dotted the W ENELA  
road, “this generated a much greater demand for consumer goods than 
before and trade at the centres prospered...administrative centres  
quickly grew into centres for loud pop music, beer drinking, modern 
dancing, cigarette and marijuana smoking, displaying new clothes,  
loose morals and bad language.”32 The opportunities provided by m i­
grant labour, predicted a British official in 1938, would also “act as a 
strong influence to emancipate the subservient tribes o f  Makuba and 
Mampukushu who when they have earned a little money will not sub­
mit so readily to the arrogant demands o f  the BaTawana proper.”32
Moremi I l l ’s reform programme met with initial success among the 
BaTawana. By making virtually every BaTawana headman a member  
of the C h ie f ’s Tribunal he had in effect ordered them to come to Maun 
and the majority did obey the call.
Moremi III also ordered to Maun the Headmen o f  the OvaHerero (also  
mistakenly called Damara), a semi-nomadic, pastoralist people who  
had migrated into western Ngamiland between 1 8 9 7 -1 9 0 6  while  escap­
ing oppressive German rule in Namibia. They had prospered in ex ile  
and their herds constituted almost a third o f  Ngam iland’s cattle.
The BaTawana were jealous o f  their good fortune and would have 
liked to see them return to Namibia, failing that they would have liked 
to have had their authority recognised. Moremi I l l ’s father had been  
humiliated in 1930 when he tried to have all their headmen removed to 
Maun. Now Moremi III hoped to bring the OvaHerero to heel; first by 
forcing their leaders to reside in Maun and then by forcing their people  
to live in permanent v il lages.  If the most proud and stubborn o f  his 
‘subject peop les ’ could be tamed then the less cohesive  BaYei and
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HaMbukushu would not pose any problems.
The OvaHerero had arrived in Ngamiland in two main groups: the 
‘Herero’ and the ‘Mbanderu’. It was the headman o f  the OvaMbande- 
ru, Hijaviposa, who led OvaHerero resistance against Moremi III. He 
refused to come to Maun on account o f  the Tsetse fly; if  he went to 
Maun, he argued, so would his people, and then their cattle would die. 
In December 1937 Hijaviposa and twelve o f  his fo llowers were tried 
by Moremi III and found guilty o f  d isobed ience; Hijaviposa was  
deposed and fined £25, his followers were fined £10. The OvaHerero  
refused to recognise the headman appointed to replace Hijaviposa and 
continued to ignore Moremi I l l ’s demands concerning Maun. A second  
trial fo llow ed in N ovem ber 1938 after which Hijaviposa was im ­
prisoned for 12 months.33
In 1939 both factions o f  the OvaHerero petitioned the Government to 
be allowed to leave Ngamiland and move to Ghanzi. The District Com­
missioner for Maun estimated that as many as 70% o f  the OvaHerero 
would go if  the Government gave them permission.34 However happy 
the BaTawana would have been to allow them to go, the Traders and 
Government were horrified at this development. The traders pointed  
out that most o f  the stores in western Ngamiland (those at Toteng, Se- 
hitwa, Tsau, Nokaneng and Gomare) depended nearly entirely upon the 
OvaHerero for their custom .35 Ngamiland would lose over 500  tax­
payers. Apart from these considerations, there was not enough grazing  
land available in Ghanzi for the would-be migrants.
The Resident Commissioner tried to persuade Moremi III to be more 
sympathetic to the demands o f  the OvaHerero: “The Damaras are dif­
ferent from other Tribes in this country. They are superior to Bakgala- 
gadi, Makuba etc. and more independent. They need more careful 
handling.”36 He advised Moremi III to g ive the OvaHerero their own  
Junior Tribunals and their own C h ie f ’s Representatives. Moremi re­
fused to soften his line: “If the Damaras are to do just as they please 
free of all Tribal control then every other sub-tribe will eventually do 
the same and the result must be chaos.”37 Expert opinions were sought,  
first from anthropologist Professor Isaac Schapera, who considered  
“the proposal to establish large villages outside Maun a policy that is 
neither desirable or feasible...nor do I think it will  so lve  the adminis­
trative difficulties existing at the present time. If anything, it will  in­
crease them, by making the people discontented.”38 He recommended 
Arden-Clark’s course o f  action: “The most satisfactory system o f  ad­
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ministering a subject people is to give it some share in running its own  
affairs.”
Tshekedi Khama disagreed with Schapera and supported the principle
of  permanent villages: “The Damaras in Banwato (sic) country have
permanent vil lages at Mahalapye and Mabeleapodi... because the Chief
enforces the principle o f  administration upon all members o f  his tribe
irrespective o f  clan. I have still to be convinced that the Damaras in
Khama’s country have had their stock reduced etc., or have suffered39constitutionally, as a result o f  this custom .”
The apparent deadlock was broken at a meeting held in Serowe on 10 
December 1940 attended by the Resident Commissioner, the District  
Commissioners o f  Maun and Serowe, and the three dikgosi  Tshekedi, 
Bathoen II o f  the BaNgwaketse, and Moremi III. There were no repre­
sentatives o f  the OvaHerero present. A compromise settlement was 
reached: although the two leaders o f  the OvaHerero, Hijaviposa o f  the 
OvaMbanderu and Taave o f  the ‘Herero’, were to move to Maun, 
together with fourteen selected families, “ it was agreed that it was im­
practicable to model Damara settlements on the Setswana m odel”; fur­
ther they were to be given their own Junior Tribunals and they were to 
be allowed to nominate their own Headmen.40 The OvaHerero accepted  
the settlement which in effect recognised their partial autonomy.
The outcome of the dispute was a defeat for Moremi III and his re­
form programme; it may not be a coincidence that his interest in re­
form, indeed his interest in government itself, deteriorated after 1940  
and, in the words o f  British officials , he became “addicted to drink and 
w om en.”41 In September 1942 a leading member o f  the morafe  alleged  
that “all or nearly all the outside Tribunals are abandoned without the 
knowledge o f  the tribe, while the Representatives concerned continue  
to draw their monthly salaries.”42 In the fo llow ing year it was d is­
covered that Moremi III and other members o f  the morafe  had syste ­
matically  s to len  from the Tribal Treasury. And in 1943  District  
C o m m iss io n e r  S u l l iv a n  reported that “ the C h i e f ’s R e p r e se n ta ­
tives .. .are  certain ly  in e ff ic ien t  and unreliable and probably cor­
rupt...the constant friction between the BaTawana and the subservient  
tribes is due mainly to the corruption and ineff ic iency o f  the Tribal A d­
ministration.”43 Even his mentor, Tshekedi Khama, had lost confidence  
in Moremi III: “the man is quite useless” he told a Government o f f i ­
cial.44
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In May 1945 Moremi III was banished from the Reserve for a year 
with the hope that he would “dry out” in exile . On his return to Maun 
in June 1946 it appeared that his drinking had been brought under con­
trol; however his reformation was short-lived and in November 1946  
he was killed in a car accident caused by drunken driving.
Moremi I l l ’s pathetic end must not obscure the promising start he 
made to his ten-year reign, particularly his ‘big v i l la g e ’ reforms which  
did eventually achieve viability; nor should his failure to revitalise the 
BaTawana state be explained only in terms o f  his a lcoholism . It was a 
formidable, perhaps impossible goal. His greatest handicap was Maun 
itself, his capital. By 1946, most o f  the BaTawana who had obeyed  
Moremi I l l ’s 1937 call to return to Maun had either moved 60  miles  
away to Lake Ngami or gone back to their cattle posts. District Com ­
missioner Arnauld ‘Gerry’ Germond reported that “the existing Maun 
village is a mere empty shell and the C hief finds him self deserted by 
his people and Tribal administration has become well nigh impossible.  
Control over the tribe is being lost and Tribal Authority is being stead­
ily weakened.”45
At a kgotla  meeting held just two months before his death, Moremi 
III and his senior headmen managed to convince Germond that the mo­
rafe  had to move from Maun. They complained that for years Govern­
ment had promised to control the spread o f  Tsetse fly and had thereby 
secured the agreement o f  the m orafe  to stay. Now not only livestock  
but people were dying: “without stock the people cannot plough and 
the children are cut o ff  from their most important item o f  diet-milk. 
The risk of death from sleeping sickness is a very real one which the 
people are not prepared to face."46 However the Government was still 
not prepared to move from Maun; as Germond him self realised such a 
course o f  action would be a “cause o f  embarrassment and expense to 
Government, Churches and Traders.”47 Instead Government approved  
a scheme, funded by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, to 
protect Maun and surrounding areas from the Tsetse fly. Between 1946  
and 1952, R52,847 was spent on the construction o f  kraals, game shoot­
ing and bush clearing.48 The scheme met with limited success; Maun 
itself was protected but the fly continued to thrive and spread in the 
surrounding areas; until grazing and agricultural land was cleared of  
the fly Maun would still be an unpopular capital.
The continuing refusal o f  many o f  the leading BaTawana to reside in 
Maun, at least for part o f  the year, remained a major stumbling block
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to the reform process, a process which was continued by the new ruler 
of the BaTawana, Moremi I l l ’s widow, Pulane Moremi. She was chosen  
by the morafe  to act as Regent until the majority of her eldest son, Let- 
sholathebe II, then only six years old. It was a popular choice, particu­
larly among the OvaHerero, BaYei and MaMbukushu, who perhaps 
thought that Pulane, who was not a MoTawana but a M oRolong from 
the Orange Free State, would be more sympathetic to their interests 
than one o f  Moremi I l l ’s uncles. Some o f  the uncles did oppose Pu- 
lane’s election, but they were outvoted by both the morafe  and the G o v ­
ernm ent. The latter  had a very  g o od  o p in io n  o f  Pulane as an 
administrator (she had been an efficient and honest Tribal Treasurer) 
and had nothing good to say o f  any o f  the uncles, except Naledi M oga­
lakwe, who was appointed Pulane’s adviser.49
In June and July 1947 the Resident Commissioner, Anthony Sillery, 
conducted Evelyn Baring, the High Commissioner, on a tour o f  N gam i­
land. In his report o f  the tour, Baring described the BaTawana as being  
“feeble and degenerate .”50 He was particularly concerned, given the 
trouble recently caused the Government by the insensitive treatment o f  
the BakaNswazwi and BaaKalanga by Tshekedi Khama, about the 
possibility o f  revolt against BaTawana overlordship; but he was in­
formed that none o f  the subject peoples “so far shows signs o f  active  
movement against BaTawana control.”51
In April 1948, four representatives o f  the BaYei, a schoolteacher, a 
church deacon, a policeman and a Tsetse fly control department em ­
ployee, presented a petition to the District Commissioner in Maun. 
During the summer months, moderate opinion had prevailed over a s e c ­
tion o f  the BaYei who wanted complete independence from the BaTa­
wana. The petition put forward four “demands” first they wished to 
have their own kgotlas\  second they wanted representatives at every  
level o f  the administration “open and confidentia l”, third they wanted 
“full right to the use o f  land for purposes o f  grazing and ploughing” ; 
and lastly they wanted an end to the practice whereby a MoTawana  
master had claimed the property, and som etimes the children of, his 
MoYei servant on the latter’s death.52 Demands one and two were o b ­
viously influenced by the OvaHerero agitation o f  1939 -41 ;  however  
demands three and four were examples o f  how the BaYei thought they 
were still oppressed and enslaved by the institution o f  batlhanka.  The 
petition demanded not just political equality but also social and eco n ­
omic equality with the BaTawana.
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Government was sympathetic to these demands. The District C om m is­
sioner told the BaYei that although self-rule was out o f  the question “at 
least for the present,” he would advise the Regent to grant demands one 
and two. As to ba tlhanka , Government would assure them “the normal 
rights o f  human beings living in free soc ie t ie s .53 It was with the com ­
forting knowledge o f  Government support for their case that the BaYei 
presented their petition formally in kgotla  during July and August 
1948.
The BaTawana gave  the BaYei a hostile  reception; their repre­
sentatives were bullied unmercifully and treated with unconcealed con­
tempt.54 When the BaYei made their demand for equal access to land, 
arguing that the BaTawana had dispossessed the BaYei, the BaTawana  
produced Magotse, headman o f  the BaSarwa, who claimed he had the 
right to allocate the use o f  the land “o f  which the Makoba dispossessed  
him before the arrival o f  the BaTawana.”55 Tricks like this made no im­
pression upon the BaYei; they remained steadfast and defiant, much to 
the indignation o f  their ‘masters.’ When both sides had had their say, 
the Regent had to make her judgment. She was in a very difficult po­
sition, caught between pressure from the Government to grant conces­
sions, and the conservative opinion o f  the BaTawana headmen who  
likened the position o f  the BaYei to that o f  the African under the Eu­
ropean.
Pulane Moremi very cleverly tried to placate both Government and 
the BaTawana. The BaYei were given their own kgotlas  and were told 
that further concessions regarding representation at other levels  o f  the 
Administration would depend upon how they operated the new kgot­
las.  The continued existence o f  batlhanka  was denied; i f  there were 
complaints, they were to be sent to the Regent or her representatives. 
It was a limited concession  but one which satisfied Government. At the 
same time the Regent announced her intention to prosecute some of the 
BaYei for contempt o f  kgotla  and confined ninety o f  them to Maun 
prior to the trials. By the prosecution o f  ‘disrespectful’ BaYei Pulane 
Moremi hoped to salve BaTawana pride. Unfortunately Government 
was not prepared to a llow the BaYei to be persecuted. The District 
Commissioner quashed verdicts and reduced fines, provoking the Re­
gent into writing an outraged letter to the Resident Commissioner  
claiming the policy o f  indirect rule had been abandoned in Ngami­
land.56
The Regent thought she had been betrayed by the Government; if  she
could have withdrawn the concessions made to the BaYei she would 
have done so. As it was, she did her best to ensure that the process of  
setting up the new kgotlas,  and the villages which were built around 
them, was as prolonged and as difficult as possible. The BaYei were 
encouraged to take their cases to the kgotla  o f the C h ie f ’s Representa­
tive not to the new kgotlas; two k go t la s , at Nokaneng and Seropa, had 
to be moved and re-built because they were not built on the sites chosen  
by the C h ie f ’s Representatives. Only in 1950 were the BaYei k go t la s , 
five in all at Maun, Nokaneng, Sepopa, Seronga and Shorobe, function­
ing properly.57
The group o f  conservative BaTawana headmen who had opposed Pu- 
lane M oremi’s appointment as Regent, and who had had their suspi­
cions confirmed concerning her ‘progressive’ v iews by the BaYei  
concessions, began to complain that she was ignoring the advice o f  her 
elected adviser, Moshupa, and the other senior headmen of the morafe.  
They were particularly jealous o f  her Tribal Secretary, Leetile Radit- 
ladi, a MoNgwato royal dissident, whom the ‘m alcontents’ (the G ov­
ernment’s label) claimed had an evil and undue influence over her. In 
December 1950 Raditladi called a meeting of senior headmen and 
sharply criticised some o f  the C h ie f ’s Representatives and the Deputy  
Regent, Moshupa, for failing to attend to their duties (Moshupa had re­
placed Naledi Mogalakwe in January 1949 when the latter had fallen 
seriously ill). The Tribal Secretary suggested that unless improvements  
were made the Government would impose a council over their heads. 
The ‘malcontents’ interpreted this as a promise rather than a threat 
(Raditladi was known for his progressive and anti-bogosi  v iew s).They  
made their first attack, in what was to become a long campaign, by 
laying before the Regent a list o f  complaints and demanding they be 
dealt with in kgotla.  The Regent refused to discuss the complaints; she  
had no wish to air criticisms o f  her administration in public.
Eventually, however, the complaints were discussed in public, during 
May and June 1951 .58 The ‘malcontents’ had successfu lly  stirred up 
sufficient (BaTawana) public opinion against the two foreigners (the 
Regent and Raditladi) to convince the District Commissioner that it 
would be more dangerous to ignore the “malcontents” than to attempt 
to answer their charges. He in turn persuaded the Regent, much against  
her better judgment to deal with the matter in the kgotla .  As it turned 
out, the Regent was wise to be fearful: the “malcontents” expertly man­
aged the meetings to make it appear that their view s had majority sup­
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port. The Regent was forced to ask Raditladi to resign. To add insult to 
injury, during the course o f  the discussions Moshuga claimed that the 
Regent had asked him “to allow her to have the key o f  nature”, in other 
words to treat Raditladi as her husband.59 Moshupa suggested that 
Raditladi hoped thereby to rule the morafe,  aided by a council which  
he would control. Pulane Moremi was embarrassed and humiliated by 
M oshupa’s statements, which even if they were true should not have 
been made in open kgotla.  She emerged from the meetings determined  
to seek revenge upon Moshupa and the ‘malcontents’.
She outlined her strategy to Government in the weeks fo llow ing her 
defeat in kgotla: she was “determined to allow all sections o f  my tribe 
-  Bayei, Hambukushu, Damaras e tc . -  to take part in the affairs o f  her 
administration...this policy is inimical to that o f  domination which the 
Batawana proper favour regarding the position o f  the subject tribes. 
Cattle kings advocate the selling o f  breeding stock so that the poor 
Bayei may sell all theirs and then become the servants o f  the wealthy  
Batawana.”60
She planned to use the subject peop les’ demands for autonomy as her 
stick with which to beat the ‘malcontents’; it was her intention to re­
place Moshupa with a council o f  advisers, prominent among whom  
would be representatives o f  BaYei and OvaHerero. She received the 
backing o f  the Government for her plans in August 1951, when the 
Resident Commissioner visited Maun and publicly rebuked Moshupa 
for attempting to subvert the R egent’s authority. She received another 
boost to her confidence when a petition from the Mabudutsu ward in 
Maun, according to the District Commissioner “the only non-moribund  
Maun k g o t l a ”6 declared that “it is not all the Batawana who find fault 
with Raditladi, and who desire his d ism issa l .. . .” The BaYei, or rather 
Headman Moeti Samotsoko who claimed to be ch ief  o f  the BaYei, then 
came forward to offer their support for the Regent and Raditladi, 
though the offer was combined with a demand that she appoint BaYei 
as C h ie f’s Representatives.63 Convinced that she now out-gunned the 
‘malcontents’, the Regent dismissed Moshupa as her adviser and in­
vited Raditladi to stay on as her Tribal Secretary. Prudence, and the ad­
v ice  o f  District C om m iss ion er  Bent, dictated that her council of  
advisers be limited to three, and all BaTawana royals.
The ‘malcontents’ took up the R egent’s challenge by organising their 
own petition, signed by 58 BaTawana, demanding the removal o f  Radit­
ladi and another kgotla  to discuss the R egent’s administration.64 They
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also began to make collections for the hiring o f  a Mafeking lawyer. A  
kgotla  was held in December 1951 where it was announced that Radit­
ladi had decided not to take up the Regent’s offer to stay on. The peti­
tion was treated with barely concealed contempt by the Regent and she  
abruptly ended the kgotla  before there could be public d iscussion .65 
The ‘malcontents’ were taken by surprise; their real target was the Re­
gent and they had hoped to use the kgotla  as a platform from which to 
demand her resignation. They protested to the District Commissioner  
to no avail, and then spent the next few days holding secret meetings  
and making vague threats. Meanwhile the Regent held meetings o f  her 
own throughout the Reserve to present her case and garner support.
It was at this stage o f  the conflict that District Commissioner Bent 
tried to define the identity o f  the petitioners or ‘malcontents’and what 
motivated them.66 According to Bent, some o f  the petitioners were tax 
collectors and junior clerks who had been dismissed for fraud and in­
competence; only three were royal headmen or dikgosana  (two o f  
these had also been convicted o f  fraud). Over half o f  the petitioners  
were basim ane b a k g o s i (lit. ‘boys o f  the c h ie f ’), men who, although  
commoners, acted as advisers and administrative servants o f  the kgosi.  
But the key to the (m alcontent’s) motivation, suggested Bent, was the 
fact that most o f  the ringleaders were the big kgam elo  , royal cattle hol­
ders.
Not since the reign of Mathiba had the kgam elo  holders been called  
upon to hand over cattle to the kgosi,  and it was B en t’s contention that 
the actions o f  the kgam elo  holders “were direeted against the building  
and rise o f  a strong chieftainship, which might enforce its customary  
rights against them, particularly as the chieftainship is poor and they 
are rich.”67 He bolstered his argument by the claim that the ‘m alcon­
tents’ had always wanted to gain custody o f  the Regent’s sons and bring 
them back to Maun: “the vision o f  a young ch ief educated outside their 
influence, succeeding to an efficient administrative system, and sure 
of the strong loyalty o f  most o f  his own Batawa and all o f  the subject 
peoples may well be a nightmare to them.”68
The annual kgotla  meetings were held in March and April. The ‘mal­
contents’ attempted to persuade people travelling to Maun to turn back  
“because we have no Chief in Maun now.”69 According to the District 
Com m issioner the kgo t la s  were well attended, particularly by the 
BaYei, who by now were in contact with Santudu and Moshupa in an 
effort to place a foot in both cam ps.70 The ‘m alcontents’ acknowledged  
their failure to win over their own morafe  by turning to others in the
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Protectorate for support; a delegation including Moshupa and the 
mother o f  Moremi 111 was sent first to Serowe, and then to Molepo-  
lole. They argued that Moshupa had been dismissed as deputy regent 
in order to avenge his refusal to allow the Regent and Raditladi to live 
together as man and wife. The three appointed advisers, they com ­
plained, were junior to many other more suitable men (that is, them­
selves). The delegation was listened to politely by Tshekedi and 
Kgari, but neither help nor encouragement was offered.71 They re­
turned despondent to Maun, leaving Moshupa to consult a lawyer in 
Zeerust.
The BaYei were also consulting a firm of lawyers. In May Mr. Ra- 
phaely o f  Bulawayo informed the District Commissioner that the 
BaYei had instructed him to take steps to have “their leader, Moeti Sa- 
motsoko...restored to the post o f  Chief with the same prerogatives en­
joyed in the past by Samkuze and Samaje...they wish to conduct their 
own kgotlas  where their disputes can be adjudicated according to their
own customs and they also wish to have control of their taxes and 72treasury.” District Commissioner Bent, after dism issing their griev­
ances (“their ch ief  is the Batawana chief, and their future in the Ba­
tawana reserve is as Batawana”) advised the BaYei, through Mr. 
Raphaely, that “ they had nothing to gain by intrigue with reactionary 
elements...further vain separatist ambitions and action by a number
of half-educated BaYei may well also result in Government interest73in their progress being m odified .” In September 1952 Mr. Raphaely  
wrote to the Resident Commissioner, again on behalf o f  Moeti Samot-  
soka, applying for his recognition as Chief, for independent fiscal 
control, independent kgotlas,  and “independence o f  control by the Ba­
tawana tribe.”74 This was a full-blown demand for recognition as an 
independent tribe. Mat'eking replied that the BaYei “are an immature 
people who have everything to learn and whose separatist claims are 
quite unrealistic and unacceptable.”75
Meanwhile, Moshupa returned from Zeerust in August after consult­
ations with his lawyer. He and fifty other petitioners held a meeting  
on 6th August without first seeking permission from the Regent; the 
site o f  the meeting was M orem i’s grave.76 This open act o f  defiance  
was followed by threats o f  v io lence and talk o f  assassination. Bent 
feared there would be an attempted coup d ’etat and asked for police  
reinforcements from Serowe. The Regent summoned Moshupa to 
answer charges relating to the illegal meeting o f  6 August and he ap­
peared in court, the Maun Senior Tribunal, on 18 August. Talk o f  v i ­
o lence continued but nothing came o f  it. Moshupa was found guilty  
and sentenced to six months hard labour or a fine o f  £275 , suspended  
for two years, provided he reside outside Maun for at least a year. On 
5 September M oshupa’s lawyer, Mr. Coulson, f lew in from Zeerust to 
discuss an appeal. The ‘malcontents’ were split into two factions: 
moderates who wanted Coulson to negotiate a reconciliation with the 
Regent, and a larger group who wanted Coulson to engineer a formal 
enquiry into the Regent’s administration and thereby topple her from 
power. The latter won out and Coulson was instructed to continue the 
fight.77
In May 1953, shortly before the result o f  the appeal was made known, 
the Resident Commissioner called the leading ‘malcontents’ to Ma- 
feking. He had heard that they were preparing to “make disorders  
against the Regent” if  Moshupa lost the appeal and he warned them 
that the Government would have no hesitation" in sending forces of  
Police to Maun and instructing them to meet force with greater 
force.”78 He blamed the ‘malcontents’ and the divisions they had cre­
ated among the BaTawana for the emergence of BaYei separatism. His 
warning ended with a threat o f  imprisonment “ if they continued on 
their present course .” Ironically, four days later all the sentences in 
the Moshupa trial were quashed by the Chief Justice and substituted 
by a £6 fine. However, the ‘m alcontents’ did not attempt to capitalise  
on their victory, the warning from the Resident Commissioner had had 
its desired effect.
BaTawana infighting had certainly encouraged BaYei separatism, but 
perhaps as important had been the encouragement offered the BaYei  
by the British them selves. The creation o f  BaYei kgotlas  had been 
forced on the Regent by the Government and all it had done was to 
engender a hunger for more radical concessions. More important still 
were the economic and social changes being wrought by migrant la­
bour, the creation o f  Tswana-type v il lages on the edges o f  the Delta, 
the slow spread of the Tsetse fly which increased competition for graz­
ing and tillage, and the closer government, in particular more efficient  
tax collection, introduced by Moremi III. Separatist politics emerged  
as a response o f  those BaYei who saw these new demands and press­
ures as a threat to their way o f  life, to their very identity as BaYei. 
There was a sense that assimilation into Tswanadom -  as represented 
by those BaYei who were unashamed to call them selves M akuba , the
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BaTawana term for the BaYei meaning ‘useless peop le’-  had pro­
ceeded too far. The separatists made conscious efforts to revive that 
identity. In the process they invented tradition, for example claiming  
that Moeti Samotsoko was the legitimate ‘c h ie f ’ o f  the BaYei, and 
relived past injustice by means o f  their efforts to prove the continued  
existence o f  botlhanka.
In April 1953 came the most coherent statement yet o f  the aspira­
tions o f  BaYei separatism. Its form was an appeal to the High Com ­
missioner authored by the schoolteacher B. Yane. It began: “We the 
BaYei o f  Ngamiland do hereby a ^ e a l  to Your Excellency to declare 
us independent o f  the Batawana.” Yane went on to counter the Brit­
ish charge that the BaYei were too young to lead themselves by point­
ing out that when the Israelites went into Egypt they “were only a mob 
of people, but M oses made them into a nation.” Though they had lived  
together with the BaTawana for 150 years, this did not mean the BaYei 
had lost their identity; had the British lost theirs, he asked, when they 
lived with the Romans for 300 years? The appeal ended by asking 
whether the “Act passed by the British Parliament in 1833, setting all 
slaves free applied to all British subjects.”
The petition did not fall upon totally deaf ears. Two new men in the 
administration, J. Millard and J. Allison,Officer-in-Charge, Northern 
Protectorate, and District Commissioner, Maun, respectively, were in 
a radical, reformist frame o f  mind. Millard had been imported from 
Tanganyika to help hasten the process o f  reform in the Protectorate 
with a v iew  to its preparation for eventual self-rule. He began by 
corresponding with A llison as to how Ngamiland could be trans­
formed into a democratic model for the other districts. The institution 
of chieftainship, they were agreed, survived only because o f  propping 
up by the Government. Even if Government was to continue to sup­
port BaTawana hegemony, it was likely that Ngamiland would very  
soon become ungovernable, as a consequence o f  separatist politics  
and divisions among the BaTawana them selves., they argued. The 
chieftainship was regarded “as something oppressive, extraneous to, 
and unsympathetic to the Tribe. Unless the Tribe through its Native 
Authority can begin to regard itself as a part o f  Government, and re­
gard its own Native Authority as a stepping stone to taking part in cen­
tral government, there can be no political development towards any 
measure o f  effective self-ru le.”8 Their proposed solution was to 
broaden the basis of chieftainship by introducing a representative tri­
bal council,  “i f  this is adequately done, and the ch ief  acts by and with
the full authority o f  all sections of the Tribe, then there can be no
81scope for working o f  any disruptive e lem ents .”
Mafeking responded cautiously to these radical proposals but M il­
lard and Allison were given permission to discuss them with the Re­
gent. It was made clear to them that her cooperation was a prerequisite 
for any further development.
While this approach was being made, in the words o f  Allison, “Bayei
82aspirations appear to be coming to a head.” Three BaYei repre­
sentatives, Chombo Saudi, Yane and Naga Ovoya, approached the D is ­
trict Commissioner with a sum of £75 which they had collected for the 
payment o f  the headman and scribe o f  Maun kgotla. For the past year 
they had been pressing for the payment by Government o f  all BaYei  
headmen and scribes, a right accorded to their BaTawana equivalents  
but refused the BaYei on the ground o f  cost. Allison was very sym ­
pathetic to their proposal and told them he would accept the £75 and 
did his best to persuade the Regent o f  the justice o f  their cause. She 
was not so persuaded. She also took the opportunity o f  informing A l­
lison that she was not going to cooperate with his “democratisation” 
programme: “she could not herself be expected to take action which  
might reduce the authority o f  her son, whose official guardian she  
w as.”83 A llison went to Mafeking and told the Resident Commissioner  
that he was prepared “to impose the reforms on the people” but he was 
rebuffed by W. F. Mckenzie who said “he was not prepared to force  
the pace in the face o f  opposition by the people...he preferred to tackle 
local government reforms for the Territory as a whole rather than 
piecem eal.”84 A llison was humiliated further by an order to return the 
£75 to the BaYei.
The Regent was convinced, with some justification, that A llison  and
Millard had encouraged the BaYei in their separatism. They now did
their best to correct that impression. At a meeting held in August with
the BaYei leaders and their lawyer, A llison and Millard presented such
a picture o f  Government obduracy that they managed to persuade the
BaYei (if  only temporarily as it turned out) to waive their demands for • 8Sindependence and withdraw their appeal to the High Commissioner.
In return they were promised that there would be democratic reform
of local government, with representative councils, but they would
have to bide their time, “make their peace with the Regent and, by the
efficient administration o f  their tribunals and kgotlas  prove that they
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were worthy of serious consideration..”86
In December 1953 Allison wrote a lengthy report in which he co n ­
cluded that the BaYei had only two real grievances: exclusion  from 
the inner councils  o f  the Chief and exclusion  from the o ffice  o f87C h ie f’s Representative. There were BaYei representatives on the 
Finance and School Committees, nearly twice as many BaYei ch ild­
ren attended schoo l than did BaTawana children, and there was  
equality before the law (at least in theory). Nor could Allison find e v i ­
dence o f  any discrimination in the allocation o f  land. What discrim i­
nation did take place was confined to the social sphere, even here it 
was largely artificial, “stimulated as a political move against the Re­
gent.” He concluded that the majority o f  BaYei were quite content to 
be integrated with the BaTawana and indeed wore the name ‘Makuba’ 
without shame; the SeYei language was itself dying and SeTswana  
was had replaced it in all but the remote areas o f  Ngamiland.
Separatist politics was carried on by a minority o f  BaYei who were  
motivated “by a desire for paid o f f ic e .” There were deeper motives:  
“the urge to be free from the BaTawana is in fact the new African d is­
satisfaction with systems so rigid that there exists no opportunity for 
those within the system to alter and bring about changes they desire  
and which they imagine will create some new utopian l ife .”
The solution was made simple: “ the only future for the Ngamiland  
peoples as a whole, or singly, is full integration in one homogenous  
group” and this would only be achieved by reform o f  the tribal admin­
istration so that it would become possible for “anyone and everyone  
to play a more reasoned part in the system .”
A llison left Ngamiland at the end o f  1954 somewhat disillusioned.  
His August 1953 agreement with the BaYei had proved to be a ch im e­
ra: separatist agitation continued throughout 1954 and he eventually  
urged Government to consider police and legal action against the 
BaYei leaders. He was now convinced that the creation o f  the BaYei 
leaders. He was now convinced that the creation o f  the BaYei kgotlas  
in 1948 had been a major mistake -  he called them “nuclei o f  separ­
atism” -  and he advocated their closure.88 Mafeking treated his pleas 
for punishment o f  the BaYei with the same indifference as they had 
treated his pleas for their ‘democratisation’.
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V. Reform and the Emergence of 
Nationalist Politics in Ngamiland 
1954-1966
The BaYei were now faced with a Government seem ingly unwilling  
to engage in dialogue, threatening legal action, and were now without 
their lawyer (Ben Baron and Partners had abandoned them after the 
August 1953 conference). During 1954 and 1955 their complaints fell 
upon deaf ears. Government advised the BaYei to take their grievan­
ces to the Regent and the Regent simply ignored them. However the 
separatists did find a way o f  making the Government listen -  they 
went over the heads o f  the District, Resident and High Commissioners  
and took their case to London.
The nephew o f  M oengwe Mpho, Motsamai Mpho, had left N gam i­
land in 1948 to live and work as a social worker, clerk and eventually  
journalist (for the N ew  A g e)  in Johannesburg. There he got involved  
in nationalist politics and became an organiser for the African Na­
tional Congress. In 1956 Mpho wrote to the British Labour Party M. 
P., (Archibald) Fenner Brockway, to ask him to plead the case o f  the 
BaYei “who were suffering slavery now, under the regime o f  the B a­
Tawana” and whose plight was being ignored by the protectorate ad­
ministration.89 Fenner Brockway wrote to the Under-Secretary o f  
State for the Commonwealth and asked him “to look into this mat­
ter.”90 The Under-Secretary then asked the High Commissioner to 
answer M pho’s allegations, who in turn asked the Resident and D is ­
trict Commissioners to present the G overnment’s case. Once again 
Mafeking stated that the separatists did not represent the majority of  
BaYei, that there was no slavery in Ngamiland, and that the BaYei  
were in fact well-represented at nearly all levels o f  tribal administra­
tion. This situation would be improved further, the District Com m is­
sioner explained, when the system of local councils  was introduced: 
there were plans for 9 local councils in Ngamiland o f  whose 36 m em ­
bers, 12 would be BaYei.91
Brockway sent Mpho the Government’s reply and Mpho met with the 
separatist leaders at Palapye in May 1957 to draw up their response. 
Mpho was now their “honorary secretary” and after the meeting he
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drafted a long letter to Brockway entitled “The Long Standing D e­
mands and Grievances o f  the BaYei People in Ngamiland.”92 Their 
disillusionment with Mafeking was such that Mpho demanded a C om ­
mission o f  Enquiry to be sent from London to look into the BaYei 
grievances. He denied that the BaYei wanted Moeti Samotsoko to be 
their chief; on the contrary, Mpho said he encouraged the BaYei “to 
demand the abolition o f  chieftainship and to fight for the estab­
lishment o f  a legislative assembly right through the Bechuanaland  
Protectorate.”93 Nationalist rhetoric now informed the BaYei protest 
but it remained to be seen whether it would be taken up by the other 
BaYei leaders.
The response o f  the Protectorate administration was predictable: 
“most o f  the complaints raised by them (the BaYei) are distorted facts  
or com pletely  untrue allegations.”94 It was suggested that “once the 
young C hief assumes o ff ice  the Bayei separatist movement will  die a 
natural death, but in their own interests the existing malcontents are 
determined to get what they can while they can.”9 Government did 
agree however to another round table conference with the Bayei in 
October 1958.
Ben Baron from Bulawayo was persuaded to again represent the sep­
aratists at the meeting in the absence o f  Motsamai Mpho.96 Baron 
presented three demands to Government: the BaYei wanted their own  
Chief (M p ho’s democratic nationalism was not yet taken on board), 
their own court, and their own treasury. The Government Secretary  
replied that BaYei autonomy was out o f  the question. The demand for 
their own courts had been granted, he continued, but the majority o f  
the BaYei preferred to use the courts o f  the C h ie f ’s Representatives.  
He refused to force the BaYei to use the separatists’ courts. As to treas­
uries he argued that “a number o f  weak and poor tribal treasuries 
would merely serve to retard the progress o f  the tribe.” The new area 
and district councils established in the BaTawana Reserve in July 
would solve their problems with the BaTawana administration he sug­
gested and help integrate the BaYei with the BaTawana, “such inte­
gration already existed to a very large extent.”
The Junior and Senior Tribunals created by Moremi and other Bat- 
swana dikgosi  following the 1935 Native Administration and Tribu­
nal Proclamations were intended to be more than judicial bodies, they 
were also supposed to have had an advisory role. Their function as 
local and district councils had not been fulfilled however, mainly be­
cause of the oppostion o f  dikgosi  who (quite rightly) feared that the 
councils would usurp and weaken their authority. When in the early 
1950s Government was confronted by African demands for greater 
representation at the national level in the form of a legislative coun­
cil, the government countered by demanding that dikgosi  cooperate  
first in the establishment o f  representative local and district govern­
ments. In principle, Mrs Moremi and the other dikgosi  agreed to the 
creation o f  local councils  but in practice they were unwilling to c o ­
operate fully in a process which would in effect emasculate the institu­
tion o f  chieftainship.97
The local councils established in 1958 replaced local councils cre­
ated in the m id-1950s which the Regent had ignored. The BaYei were  
thus rather sceptical about the councils as a panacea for their grievan­
ces and, as it turned out, in the short-term at least, they were correct. 
Though local councils  were chosen in 1959 they never actually oper­
ated. It was not until 1961 that local councils began to function as in­
tended by Government in Ngamiland, and then only after new councils  
were once again chosen and elected according to a model constitution  
imposed on Ngamiland and the other Reserves.98 The constitution pro­
vided for the selection o f  members to area councils by the Chief and 
tribe in kgotla .  Election from area councils to tribal or district coun­
cils would be by secret ballot, an innovation that the dikgosi,  to the 
surprise o f  British offic ials ,  were quite happy to see introduced. The 
guiding principle o f  the reforms was that in all councils there should 
be a majority o f  elected over nominated or ex-offic io  members. The 
councils had only advisory status, but it was the intention o f  Govern­
ment to transfer power in local government to these councils before  
independence.
The BaYei soon tired o f  waiting for these long-promised councils.  
Throughout 1959 and 1960 a stream o f  old and new complaints issued  
from Moeti Samotsoko, Ben Baron and Partners, and Motsamai Mpho. 
Among the new complaints were the allegations that the Regent had 
debarred the BaYei living outside Maun from associating with the sep­
aratist ringleaders in Maun, and that the BaTawana had pulled down  
huts erected by the BaYei headmen as their offices .  In August 1960  
Moeti, breaking the agreement he had made at the roundtable con­
ference o f  October 1958, made an impassioned plea for autonomy: 
“we want to be under the Government as the other tribes and to have 
our Treasure (sic) as the other tribes.”99 The response from govern­
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ment was ‘wait for the cou n c i ls .’
While Moeti pleaded in vain, Motsamai Mpho was given the oppor­
tunity, albeit against his will ,  of advocating the BaYei cause from 
within the Protectorate: on 10 August 1960 he arrived in Palapye by 
train having been deported from the Union of South Africa. M pho’s 
political sights were aimed higher than Ngamiland however; in the 
next few months he cooperated with another deportee, P. G. Matante, 
and K. T. Motsete in the founding o f  a new political party, the Bechua- 
naland P eop le’s Party.100 According to District Commissioner C. E. 
Clark, Mpho remained in touch with the BaYei separatist and in Fe­
bruary 1961, on the eve o f  the local council ‘e lec t io n s ’, advised the 
BaYei to refuse to do regimental work for the BaTawana and to ignore 
the Regent’s orders to attend kgotla  m eetings.101
Members for the ten area councils outside Maun were chosen during 
the weeks 22 February-6 March. These meetingsd were not well at­
tended; the population’s experience o f  the previous abortive councils  
had engendered apathy and indifference.10 Elections by secret ballot  
o f  tribal or district council members were scheduled for 1 6 -2 6  March. 
It was during this lull between selection procedures that the Maun 
BaYei for the first time since their struggle for communal rights was  
launched in the 1940s engaged in organised acts o f  c ivil disobedience.  
On 13 March, Moeti Samotsoko ordered the BaYei women o f  Maun 
not to join the rest o f  the wom en in their regimental work o f  w eeding  
the kgotla  in preparation for the forthcoming annual meeting.
This act o f  difiance was fo llowed on 26 March by a boycott o f  the 
special kgotla  meeting called by the Regent to hear the names o f  those 
chosen to serve on the Maun area council. At first, the Regent did 
nothing; she was advised by the District Commissioner to let tempers  
cool. She was then accused by the BaTawana ‘m alcontents’ o f  taking 
bribes from the BaYei. Tempers did not cool. The Maun area council  
elected three members to sit on the tribal council on 15 April. In a let­
ter dated 17 April, the day the annual kgotla  was due to begin, Moeti  
wrote to the District Commissioner expressing his outrage that “o f  the 
three members elected, not a single MoYei was called upon as a m em ­
ber. These local councils create old laws o f  slavery....We thought that 
they would bring us freedom...we intend not to attend any kgotla  
meetings with the BaTawana or any Tribal duty.” 103
True to his word, Moeti and the rest o f  the BaYei stayed away on the
opening day o f  the annual k g o t la , holding a meeting in their ow n kgo t­
la attended by an estimated 300-400  men. The next day, however, they 
did attend the Regent’s kgotla;  the District Commissioner had threat­
ened to charge them with offences under the Riotous A ssem bly  Pro­
clamation. The authorities then learned that Moeti had begun to g ive  
orders to BaYei in other areas and that these orders were being obe­
yed; it was this that decided the Regent and the District Commissioner  
to take action.
On 20 April the Regent ordered the tribe to the kgotla to hear Moeti  
and the other BaYei ringleaders being charged under the Native A d­
ministration Proclamation. They were accused o f  failing to obey and 
acknowledge the authority o f  the Regent. Messengers sent to the 
BaYei kgotla  found Moeti and 27 others; they refused to answer the 
Regent’s summons. Government police were sent to bring them by 
force, but they agreed to attend peacefully, and were duly sentenced  
to fines and imprisonments ranging from £2  or 2 weeks to £40 or five  
weeks. The BaYei gave notice that they intended to appeal and were  
granted bail .104
Ben Baron arranged a meeting between the separatists and the Re­
gent and District Commissioner in June. Baron advised the BaYei to 
bide their time and wait for the democratic reforms which Independ­
ence would bring; however the BaYei had heard such talk before. 
Moeti was very ill and his place as spokesman was taken by Chombo  
Saudo. He made the usual demands for BaYei C h ie f ’s Representatives, 
their own stock slaughtering post in Maun, and that the BaYei should 
be forced to remove to the vil lages established around those kgotlas. 
Some acknowledgem ent o f  the potential power o f  local coucils  was 
made in a demand that the BaYei should have equal representation on 
the Maun area coucil.  The District Commissioner noted that Baron’s 
advice had been ignored and the meeting had once again shown “the 
com pletely  selfish  and nationalistic attitude o f  these separatists.”105
Thirteen years had passed s ince the BaYei had begun their protest for 
communal rights in Ngamiland, yet besides the initial concessions of  
their own kgotlas  and headmen, very little had been achieved. A  var­
iety o f  tactics had been tried, ranging from petitions to civil d isobe­
dience, but the BaTawana and the Brithish had been obdurate in their 
refusal to treat the BaYei as a tribe separate from and equal to the Ba- 
Tawana. In 1961, Motsamai Mpho introduced a new strategy: invol­
vement in nationalist politics for Botswana as a whole, a strategy
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which was, on the surface, attractive but which would, in the end, 
swallow and subsume the separatist cause.
Following his deportation to the Protectorate, Motsamai Mpho co n ­
tinued to write to Brockway in London. A letter written in October 
1962 provided evidence that his support for BaYei separatism was  
now firmly subordinated to nationalist politics. He again asked Brock­
way to press for “a Com m ission to com e and investigate whether in 
fact there is still slavery going on in the BaTawana R eserve”; how ­
ever he echoed Baron in suggesting that real change would only come  
about when there were general elections based on ‘one man, one v o te ’, 
the cause o f  the BaTswana was superior to the cause o f  the BaYei: “do 
your best and our Party too will  try to educate the BaYei that tribal 
divisions are unhealthy, Bechuanaland needs one united nation irre­
spective o f  their race or creed.”106
Mpho introduced nationalist party politics to Ngamiland in the early 
months o f  1961. Though the Regent banned BPP public meetings in 
the Reserve, Mpho did establish a BPP branch in Maun, largely made 
up of BaYei separatists and some OvaHerero. The appeal o f  the party 
for these groups lay in its anti-Government, anti-dikgosi  stance. The 
BPP rejected the Legislative Council because it had reserved seats 
separately for the Africans, Europeans and Asians; Mpho and Matante 
wanted general elections based upon ‘one man, one v o te ’ fo llow ed im ­
mediately by Independence. The dikgosi  were labelled ‘Tshom bes’ be­
cause they collaborated with the British, and o f  course because they 
banned their public meetings. The BaYei, the OvaHerero, and other 
‘minority’ groups in the Protectorate such as the BaKalanga, per­
ceived that what the BPP advocated would sw eep away the authority 
o f  the dikgosi;  yet offered no clue as to what would replace that auth­
ority.,The BPP did not present a detailed alternative. There would be 
a democracy and a new nation, but how that democracy would func­
tion and how the nation would oe defined was not made clear. Nor 
were the BaYei particularly interested; what was important was that, 
in the words o f  a Government analysis o f  BaYei motives, “they (the 
BPP) are anti-Chief and in the minds o f  most o f  them the Chief and 
the Government are one and the same, simply because both represent 
‘Authority’.”107.
The dangers posed to the status quo by the BPP were also apparent 
to the Batawana, in particular to the ‘m alcontents’. The second po l­
itical party to set up shop in Ngamiland was the Bechuanaland Demo-
era tic Party, a moderate grouping of the BaNgwato elite led by Seretse  
Khama, from its very beginning identified by the Government as its 
‘heir apparent’ . By December 1961. Seretse had brought together a 
network o f  leading Batswana personalities throughout the Protector­
ate, including many o f  the ‘m alcontents’ in Ngamiland and Tsheko 
Tsheko the Tribal Secretary. The attraction o f  the BDP for the BaTa­
wana did not lie in their fascination for nationalism and nationalist 
politics; rather they saw the BDP as Se etse Khama’s party, and there­
fore the party o f  the dikgosana.  They assumed that the BDP would  
protect the interests o f  the traditional ruling elites in each reserve. The 
‘malcontents’ still  looked to the return o f  Letsholathebe, scheduled  
for December 1964, as the most important political event on the hori­
zon. The regent would be replaced by a malleable young man and their 
future, and the future o f  their large cattle herds, assured.
Nationalist politics did not replace ‘tribalism’ as Mpho had hoped; 
on the contrary it actually reinforced ethnic divisions in Ngamiland.  
Both the Batawana and the BaYei were prepared to associate them­
selves with nationalist parties and nationalist politicians, but their pol­
itical ob jec t ives  and philosophy remained firmly located in the 
politics o f  the morafe.  This is most clearly seen in the activities o f  the 
Bayei separatists during 19 63 -6 4 .
In February 1963 Moeti Samtsoko died after a long illness; even in 
death he managed to flout the authority of the Regent by being buried 
in the BaYei kgotla  instead of, as was demanded by the BaTawana, in 
the tribal burial ground. M oeti’s eldest son, Jacob Moeti, was chosen  
as his successor as headman, but he asked for his installation to be 
postponed for a year in order to settle his father’s estate. Meanwhile  
Chombo Saudo acted in his place and attempted, as Moeti had done, 
to act as ‘C h ie f ’ o f  all the BaYei but without official recognition. 
When twelve months had passed, Chombo used Letsholathebe’s forth­
coming installation as an opportunity to make the separatists’ most 
ambitious demands to date. 8 The installation o f  Jacob Moeti was  
compared with that o f  the BaTawana kgosi:  Jacob would be installed  
on four conditions: he must be recognised as ‘C h ie f’ o f  the BaYei; he 
must have the same authority as the Regent; he must have his own tri­
bal administration; and, most radical of all, an area in Ngamiland must 
be proclaimed BaYei territory (a site for the BaYei capital had already 
been chosen on the eastern side o f  the Thamalakane river, five or six  
miles from Maun). The Regent prudently ‘passed the buck’; she de­
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cided to postpone any further d iscussion o f  BaYei demands until after 
the installation o f  her son. Chombo, however, approached the G ov­
ernment in August 1964 with his demand for land: “ On account o f
some troubles wc have experienced so far, we want to get our land109back before self-government com es into operation.
Implied in that statement was mistrust o f  what nationalist politics  
and independence would bring the BaYei. Chombo and the separatist 
wanted official recognition as a ‘tribe’, and all the rights associated  
with that recognition including their own reserve. It had become ob­
vious, not least from the speeches o f  Motsamai Mpho, that although 
nationalist politicians wished like the BaYei to destroy BaTawana  
autocracy in Ngamiland they could not be relied upon to ‘restore’ 
communal rights. The rules o f  the game were changing; political le­
gitimacy was no longer only defined through the institution o f  Tswa- 
na-style chieftainship, b o g o s i , but also by appeals to a new political 
identity, to a new political community. Mpho would fight for the 
rights o f  the BaYei, but his definition o f  ‘rights’ were those o f  a citizen  
o f  a modern nation-state.
Chom bo’s appeal to the Government met with the same fate as all 
the other appeals for autonomy made since the early 1950s: Govern­
ment policy was to “ integrate all the residents o f  Ngamiland into a 
unified form o f  local administration.” 110 Thus, although the BaYei  
mistrusted the nationalists, there seemed no alternative but to trust 
them with their c a u se -  at least they spoke in the only political lan­
guage that Government appeared to understand. District Com m is­
sioner G ass’s report on the BaYei ‘problem’ noted that “there can be 
little doubt that the Bayei leadership and the vast majority o f  the tribe 
are under the influence o f  the BIP (Botswana Independence Party) 
and, more particularly, Motsamai Mpho, who is considered to be their 
‘saviour’.”111 The Botswana Independence Party had been founded 
by Mpho in 1963 after factionalism had split the BPP. The BPP had 
torn itself apart over a com plex web o f  issues: a personal struggle for 
leadership between Mpho and Matante; M atante’s intolerance o f  
M pho’s links with the ANC; allegations o f  the misuse o f  party funds 
and party vehicles; and a quarrel over the siting o f  the party headquar­
ters. The split and the ensuing battle for control o f  the party, event­
ually won by Matante hence M pho’s formation o f  the BIP, left the 
field clear for the BDP who concentrated their energies on building a 
strong network o f  elite support in the rural areas. In Ngamiland the
BDP prospered rather well from the split. With the formation o f  the 
BIP in 1963 the non-BaTawana vote was fragmented. Mpho failed to 
convince the population o f  Ngamiland, let alone the population o f  the 
rest o f  the protectorate, that his party was truly a ‘national’ party; he 
was looked upon as a spokesman for the BaYei and his party was per­
ceived to be the party o f  the BaYei.
In the first General Election held in March 1965, the BDP won all 
three Ngamiland constituencies:
Maun/Chobe: BDP 2,446; BPP 1,599; BIP 1,099;(81% poll)
Okavango: BDP 1,929; BIP 1,666; (65% poll)
Ngami: BDP 2,054; BPP 54; (54% poll)112
In the words o f  the District Commissioner, “had BIP and BPP joined  
forces ,  they w ou ld  probably have returned their candidates  in 
Maun/Chobe and Okavango, where BPP candidate’s nomination was 
not accepted .” Not one BIP candidate was successful in the General 
Election anywhere in the Protectorate. The party was more successful  
in the Local Government elections of June 1966, winning 5 out o f  12 
seats on the North-West District Council (the party won no seats in 
any other district), however, the BDP won control o f  the council and 
therefore retained control o f  Local Government.113
The democratic reforms which the British had promised would sat­
isfy BaYei aspirations and “ integrate all the residents of Ngamiland 
into a unified plan o f  local administration” had, in fact, bolstered Ba- 
Tawana dominance. Nor did subsequent elections, local and national, 
weaken that dominance. The Botswana Independence Party won only  
one parliamentary seat in the general elections o f  1969, 1974 and 1979  
-  and that was M pho’s. And in the District Council elections the BDP  
have retained control since 1965. The BaTawana state survived in the 
guise o f  North West District; local administration was still firmly in 
the hands o f  the BaTawana cattle owning elite.
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VI. Conclusion: The Triumph of 
Tswanadom, 1966-1988
The struggle for communal rights by the BaYei originated in re­
sponse to the promise o f  central government reform, ‘democratisa- 
t ion’, o f  the traditional BaTawana state. To a certain extent baYei 
separatism was even encouraged by the colonial administration since  
it challenged baTawana hegemony. However, the ultimate objective  
of  the baYei separatists, the establishment o f  a Tswana-style state, ran 
counter to the British objective o f  intergration. By the late 1950s the 
British were grappling with the task o f  transforming tribesmen into 
citizens o f  a modern nation-state; communal politics were regarded 
as dangerous and retrogressive.
Nationalist politcs had, if not replaced, at least superseded com m u­
nal politics as the politics o f  legitimacy; the rules o f  the game had 
changed. Motsamai Mpho, hitherto one o f  the champions o f  the BaYei 
cause, agreed with the british that the concept o f  ‘communal rights’ 
had to be abandoned, or at least re-defined. No longer should the 
BaYei fight for the right to be treated as Tswana tribesmen, they 
should now join the fight to be treated as citizens o f  an independent 
Botswana. A  letter from the separatists’ lawyers to the District C om ­
missioner dated 9 June 1967, stated that “the BaYei do not ask the per­
petuation o f  Chieftainship as such, but on the contrary, they ask for 
their rights under Chieftainship while it still  exists. They feel that the 
Botswana Constitution is there to free them from the slavery and tu­
telage o f  the past.” 114 This was a despairing acknowledgem ent that 
communal rights, “rights under ch ieftainship”, were being eclipsed by 
the ‘Western’ concept o f  human/civil rights. Ironically, the appeal was  
to the Botswana Constitution, the very document which enshrined that 
new concept.
“What is remarkable in Botswana” suggests Neil Parsons, "is how  
much, up till now, the legitimacy o f  Tswanadom has been accepted  
and even supported by the non-Tswana groups.” 115 It is a legitim acy  
which is dynamic and complex. Tswana political culture has been so 
successful largely because it has been capable o f  incorporating and 
adapting foreign ideas and institutions, as well as o f  course, foreign­
ers themselves. An important change in the nature o f  this legitimacy
took place during the 1950s and 1960s, prompted mainly by pressure 
from the colonial state, as well as in response to rapid social and econ­
omic change. Superficially, this change involved a transition from 
communal politics to the politics o f  nationalism as the basis of  the le ­
gitimacy o f  Tswanadom. However, as we have seen in this essay, the 
realities of power at the local level suffered little change.
The legitimacy o f  Tswanadom had been threatened by communalism  
during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s; nowhere more seriously than in 
Ngamiland, the weakest o f  the Tswana states. Bogosi,  the touchstone  
o f  Tswanadom’s legitimacy, was in the process o f  being hijacked by 
the ‘subject peop le ’. However, in Ngamiland the BaTawana retained 
their political dominance, and Tswanadom as a whole its hold over the 
‘subject peop les ’ or ‘minority groups’ (as they are now more tactfully  
descibed), by formally eschew ing  communal politics, labelling it ‘tri­
ba lism ’. Instead the Tswana political elites embraced nationalist poli­
tics which replaced bogosi with the ‘nation’. Unlike bogosi,  which  
was in danger o f  being used to throw off  Tswana hegemony, as the 
BaYei tried to dp in Ngamiland, the definition o f  the ‘nation’ could be 
manipulated to provide Tswana culture with a monopoly o f  political 
legitimacy in Tswanadom’s new guise, the Republic o f  Botswana.
The struggle o f  the BaYei for communal rights had been sparked off  
by an infusion o f  western-style democracy into Tswanadom via Brit­
ish attempts to ‘dem ocratise’ the BaTawana state. Ironically, it was an 
even greater dose o f  western democracy, the concepts o f  human rights 
and the nation-state, which ensured the failure o f  that struggle.
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basimane ba kgosi
batlhanka
bogosi
botlhankana
kgamelo
kgosana (pi. dikosana) 
kgosi (pi. dikgosi) 
kgotla
morafe (pi. merafe)
literally “the k in g’s b oys”; the backbone 
o f  the Tswana administration.
serfs.
Kingship.
a kind o f  hereditary serfdom.
cattle given to a king’s servant in return 
for service.
headman (of a ward); royals, 
king; chief.
ward; public assembly; a place where a 
public assembly takes place.
nationm, tribe .
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